Ben Sales reports for JTA.
As Hamas terrorists streamed into Israel on Oct. 7, 2023, overrunning communities, killing 1,200 people and taking hundreds captive—many Israelis had one overarching question:
Where is the army—and how did it let this happen?
Now, nearly 17 months later, the Israel Defense Forces is providing a detailed response to that and several other questions about its conduct on Oct. 7, the leadup to it and what went wrong. A report released Thursday describes failure on multiple levels of the military’s operation and a series of missed opportunities that served as a prelude to the bloodiest day in Israel’s history.
The report has been heavily covered in Israeli media, with different publications highlighting different aspects of what amounts to a damning critique of what has long been Israel’s most trusted institution, and what one military official reportedly called “a failure of historic proportions.”
Here are some key quotes and takeaways from Israeli coverage of the report, drawn from English and Hebrew sources.
Hamas essentially conquered Israel’s southern border area with the IDF outnumbered
One of the key answers for why it took the Israeli military so long to mount an adequate response—leaving families and communities on the border to fend for themselves for hours—comes down to numbers. Hamas and other terror groups invaded with thousands fighters. Israel had less than 1,000 soldiers to defend the area.
From the Times of Israel:
When the attack began, involving over 5,000 terrorists, just 767 IDF troops were stationed on the border.
As a result of not realizing in real-time that the Gaza Division had fallen, the General Staff did not understand the severity of the attack and failed to put together an accurate picture of the operational situation. This became a major challenge during the efforts to block the attack… For nearly 10 hours, the IDF’s Gaza Division, the regional division responsible for the border with the Strip, was defeated and overrun.
Israeli military intelligence dismissed years of warnings
Israeli media refer prominently to the IDF’s mistaken “conception” of Hamas — namely, that it was not interested in war. There were plenty of signs that that was not the case, according to the military’s investigation, but they were brushed aside.
Israel Hayom reported the IDF mistakenly believed:
- That Gaza was a secondary front for fighting.
- That Hamas could be constrained.
- That a plan composed by the terror group was unrealistic.
- That the IDF’s border security measures would protect communities near Gaza.
Oct. 7 proved all of that wrong, the investigation found. Here’s Israeli Channel 12, translated from Hebrew:
The IDF’s research division indeed knew that Hamas’ vision was to liberate Palestine and conquer Israel — but within the division they saw Hamas and Sinwar as a pragmatic movement that was prepared to talk to Israel. Hamas was seen as an organization dedicated to accord and calm, that tried to gain a foothold in Judea and Samaria [the West Bank] and was wary of war.
Israel employed the ‘Hannibal Protocol’ on Oct. 7, endangering civilians’ and hostages’ lives
For more than a year, reports have swirled that Israel used the “Hannibal Protocol” when fighting back on Oct. 7—a directive to shoot anything moving in a drastic attempt to kill the enemy that also endangers noncombatants. Now, the Jerusalem Post reports, the IDF investigation says the protocol, also called a “directive,” was definitely put into action:
The Air Force was carrying out ‘the Sword of Damocles’ operation—a code name only being revealed on Thursday for the first time—to attack many Hamas commanders and their headquarters around 10:30 a.m. on October 7, 2023, just as it was carrying out the ‘Hannibal Directive’ of gunning down anything that moved around the Israel-Gaza border… The Air Force has been questioned about if the forces it had invested in attacking Hamas commanders deep in Gaza would have been better used to defend the Gaza border and to attack Hamas invaders in Israeli villages.
The report doesn’t focus on Netanyahu
The report is focused on the military’s conduct and so does not delve into decisions made by Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu or other leaders. Most of the Israeli public supports the formation of a state commission to investigate all levels of decision-making before and on Oct. 7, as has been done following other Israeli catastrophes, but Netanyahu has resisted calling for one.
Ynet reports that the prime minister continues to block “the formation of a state commission of inquiry, that would necessarily probe the political echelon led by Netanyahu throughout nearly all the years of the conception.”
At the IDF, the chief of staff, head of southern command and intelligence chief have all resigned or announced that they would.
