One of Israel’s greatest weaknesses in the past few years has been its inability to engage in multi-dimensional thinking of the kind anchored in an understanding that immediate events are the result of historical processes. At the same time, it has a tendency to focus on clearly visible phenomena without delving deeper.

The 2005 withdrawal from Gaza is an example of this. Had the disengagement been accompanied by the creation of public-works projects that would have provided a basic income to any resident of Gaza willing to work, an income clearly conditional upon the absence of hostile actions against Israel – the outcome would have been different. At the same, had first-rate resettlement assistance been extended to the Israeli families forced to leave Gaza, it would have made any future evacuation of territory easier to carry out.

Thinking-in-history, as required, leads to five insights:

1. The establishment of the State of Israel is a historic metamorphosis that constituted a shock to Islam. Arab-Muslim adjustment to this development is a long process and will continue for at least another generation or two.

2. Tensions within Islam, rooted in the difficulty of reconciling tradition with modernity, are creating regional instability, which can be expected to last at least until the end of the century, and will be accompanied by internal conflicts and aggression against the “representatives of modernity.”

3. Simultaneously, there is a rise in the power of Islamic actors, due to energy resources in their hands, growing Islamic communities in the West, the proliferation of arms (including weapons of mass destruction), and worldwide geo-strategic shifts.

4. It is impossible for Israel to dominate a large Palestinian population for long. Ignoring this fact is the biggest mistake Israel has made since statehood, and it has placed us in a historical trap of our own making.

5. No agreement between Israel and either the Palestinians or Syria will be stable if not anchored in a comprehensive regional arrangement, supported by Islamic countries and world powers, and backed up by Israeli deterrence that threatens disproportional punishment of violations.

In light of the above, Israel must take its statesmanship to a new level, while advancing on two connected axes: promoting peace as part of a comprehensive Middle East agreement and creating a deterrence that will be adequate against fanatic actors armed with weapons of mass murder. One might call it a “Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde” stance, that is, a purposeful bipolarity. On the one hand, there must be a willingness to make far-reaching concessions and offer good neighbourly relations in exchange for a warm, stable peace, and on the other, there has to be a willingness and clear ability to respond disproportionately to any aggression.

The Arab Peace Initiative, with all its problems, provides a basis for an agreement that would include the moderate Arab countries in the wider context of the Islamic states and global powers. It would be based on the common interest of the rulers of the moderate Arab states, most of the world’s powers and Israel in stabilizing the Middle East while promoting economic development and modernization.

This requires a number of policy innovations. Thus, the United States should abandon “democratization” as a policy until conditions change, since in the absence of appropriate socio-economic development, it is a recipe for extremism.

The proposed perspective should lead Israel to four conclusions:

• First, progress in the negotiations with the Palestinians and Syria must be combined with a normalization of Israel’s relations with most of the Arab and Islamic countries. Israel should not give up assets or agree, for example, to joint sovereignty over parts of Jerusalem, in exchange for agreements with the Palestinians and Syria alone. Nor can the refugee problem be solved, except in a comprehensive Middle Eastern context.

• Second, Israel must take strong deterrent action against anyone who inflicts harm on it, but it should – as much as possible – do so with the silent agreement of moderate Arab forces, and in a way that minimizes civilian casualties and similar hate-engendering damage.

• Third, because there is no guarantee that a comprehensive peace process will succeed, Israel must craft policies enabling it to thrive, even in the absence of peace and despite a series of conflicts. Such a successful policy also improves the probability of obtaining and stabilizing a Middle Eastern agreement, since it undermines hopes of wearing Israel down in stages.

• Fourth, and as a condition for all the rest, Israel must distinguish between what is important for shaping the future and short-term accomplishments. For example, while full recognition of the State of Israel is a precondition for concessions, the recognition of Israel as a “Jewish state” is without significance – since our essence depends on us, not on others.

The existence of extremist groups such as Hamas and Hezbollah and of a nuclearizing Iran makes a stable peace in the Middle East difficult to obtain. They must be contained and changes in their positions need to be brought about, peacefully if possible, but also through pressure and coercion. Therefore, offering Hamas recognition if it recognizes Israel and joins the peace process, and punishing it if it does not do so is recommended, including maintaining a demonstrated option to destroy it in the event it disturbs the peace process and engages in aggression.

Whatever the best policy may be, Israel is failing to engage in deep historical thinking. The political culture of wheeling and dealing is incapable of it, a blocked regime does not allow for it, the scarcity of multi-dimensional staff work prevents it, and only few of our senior politicians are qualified to do it.

If these failings are not addressed, we are destined to continue on a chain of responses to specific events rather than shaping events, leading to a very problematic future.

Yehezkel Dror is emeritus professor of political science at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem. He has served as a senior adviser to several Israeli prime ministers.