On Nov. 30, 1947, in response to a historic United Nations resolution passed the day before calling for the partition of Palestine into two sovereign states, one Jewish and the other Arab, Palestinian Arabs launched a series of violent attacks on Jews throughout the country.

These were the opening shots of a war that started as a limited Arab-Jewish civil war and escalated into a full-scale conflict almost six months later when five Arab armies invaded Palestine to exterminate the new Jewish state of Israel.

Benny Morris, an Israeli historian, has written a magisterial account of the War of Independence, 1948: The First Arab-Israeli War (Yale University Press). Morris, a specialist on the struggle between Zionism and Palestinian nationalism, has produced a   densely researched, richly textured, nuanced book brimming with discerning analysis and telling details. Although he writes from a pro-Zionist point of view, he tries to be scrupulously fair, and 1948 is thus the antithesis of propaganda. It will be mandatory reading for the foreseeable future, at least until Arab archives are opened to historians.

At left, the 1947 United Nations Palestine partition plan

As he points out, the considered judgment of experts in Britain, the mandatory power in Palestine, was that the Jews could not prevail and “would be thrown out.” The Palestinians had a 2-1 population advantage and enjoyed the advantage of high ground and pan-Arab support. The British, however, glossed over Jewish strengths. The Yishuv, the Jewish community of Palestine, was better prepared in terms of national organization, trained military manpower, morale and motivation and command and control.

During the first phase of the fighting, from November 1947 to March 1948, the Arabs  took and held the initiative, while the Haganah – the main Jewish force – was on the defensive. There were really no front lines, pitched battles or conquests of territory. Much of the fighting took place in and around Jerusalem, Tel Aviv-Jaffa and Haifa, in areas earmarked for Jewish statehood, and was dispersed, disorganized and highly localized.

Prior to its withdrawal on May 15, Britain, with about 100,000 troops in Palestine, generally hewed to a policy of  impartiality and non-intervention.

The tide turned in April when the Haganah, bolstered by arms shipments from Czechoslovakia and a successful recruitment drive, went on the offensive.

The Jewish leadership, headed by David Ben-Gurion, decreed that no Jewish settlement should be evacuated and should be held to the last fighter. As well, Ben-Gurion refused to define the new state’s borders, arguing that it would be demarcated by events on the ground. Under the UN partition plan, the Jews, constituting 55 per cent of Palestine’s pre-war population, were allotted 56 per cent of the land.

Palestinian military power was based on local militias in 400 of 800 Arab villages and towns. Villages and towns in the West Bank barely contributed to the war effort and were untouched by hostilities. Some Arab villages, particularly those with Druze inhabitants on Mount Carmel and the western Galilee, threw in their lot with the Jews, believing that they would win.

Both sides were reinforced by foreign volunteers. Upward of 8,000 Arabs from Egypt, Syria and Iraq joined the Arab Liberation Army, the largest, best-organized Palestinian force, led by Fawzi al-Qawugji. They were augmented by several dozen British deserters, Bosnian Muslims and a handful of former Nazi intelligence, army and SS officers. On the Jewish side, 3,000 to 4,000 volunteers, the vast majority of whom were Jewish, flocked in from all corners of the globe, including Canada and the United States.

Morris dwells at length on the Palestinian refugee problem. Within 24 hours of the eruption of fighting, Arab families in big towns began leaving, usually bound for neighbouring Arab countries. By March 1948, he notes, most wealthy and middle-class Palestinians had left Jaffa, Haifa, western Jerusalem and the heavily Jewish coastal plain. Many Arabs assumed that they would return once the war wound down. He estimates that 75,000 to 100,000 fled or were displaced during the first stage of the war.

Morris concludes that there was no systematic master plan to expel Arabs, though  outright expulsions occurred. Jewish commanders were given carte blanche to conquer Arab villages and decide each village’s fate – destruction and expulsion or occupation.

In one notable case, the Jewish mayor of Haifa, Shabtai Levy, begged Arab inhabitants to stay, but to no avail, leaving only 5,000 Arabs in the city.

By the spring of 1948, after 51/2 months of battles, the Jews had the upper hand, having captured land that the United Nations had  assigned to the Palestinians. According to Morris, these defeats, plus the exodus of Arabs from their homes and the massacre at Deir Yassin, prompted Arab states to intervene. Despite their bluster, Arab leaders, with the striking exception of King Abdullah of Transjordan, did almost nothing to prepare for the great battle ahead. Abdullah’s goal was not to destroy Israel but to seize the West Bank. He reportedly said, “The Jews are too strong, it is a mistake to make war.”

The invading Arab armies consisted of some 25,000 combat troops: 5,500 Egyptians, 4,500 Jordanians, 2,750 Syrians, 2,700 Iraqis and 2,000 Lebanese, supplemented by Arab air force personnel and Palestinian irregulars. Contingents from Saudi Arabia, Morocco, Yemen and Sudan contributed a further 68,000 soldiers. None of the armies, save the Arab Legion from Jordan, had ever fought in a war. The Arab armies were severely underequipped and left large numbers of their soldiers at home to guard against internal rebellion and upheaval.

Israel fielded 65,000 troops, or 13 per cent of its population, by July. It amassed 108,000 troops by January 1949, when the war effectively ended.

Shortly after the May 14 Arab invasion, the UN Security Council imposed a global arms embargo on the combatants. Morris says it hurt the Arabs more than the Jews because the Arab side had not expected an embargo and failed to stockpile weaponry, ammunition and spare parts. Jews, in the meantime, scoured the globe for arms, buying them from both states and private dealers.

Apart from establishing a Jewish state and surviving the Arab onslaught, the Yishuv’s war aims were two-fold: to capture additional territory and thereby create more defensible borders and to reduce the proportion of  its Arab residents. Under the partition plan, the Jewish state would have had 600,000 Jews and 500,000 Arabs, including bedouins.

During the first four weeks of the war, the strategic initiative passed into Israel’s hands and Israel added to its territorial holdings. Yet Israel lost the Jewish quarter in eastern Jerusalem; failed in counterattacks in Latrun, Isdud and Jenin; and lost the Etzion bloc and Kibbutz Mishmar Hayarden. At the last moment, Lebanon opted out of the invasion, probably due to Maronite Christian disaffection with Arab League policy on Zionism, but deployed its army defensively.

In the rest of his book, Morris discusses Israel’s battlefield triumphs – the conquest of Lod, Ramla, Be’er Sheva and the Negev – the little-known air and naval wars; Israel’s short-lived invasion of Lebanon; the armistice agreements with four Arab belligerents; Israel’s seminal and controversial decision not to allow back Palestinian refugees; and the atrocities committed by both sides.

The 1948 war gave Israel hardly any respite, and for the past 60 years, Israel has fought a succession of skirmishes and wars, with no end in sight. Peace may be possible one day, but for now, Israel fights for its survival.